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Tuesday, July 28, 2020 | History

2 edition of Yardstick competition and political agency problems found in the catalog.

Yardstick competition and political agency problems

Paul Belleflamme

Yardstick competition and political agency problems

by Paul Belleflamme

  • 201 Want to read
  • 24 Currently reading

Published by Queen Mary University of London Department of Economics in London .
Written in English


Edition Notes

StatementPaul Belleflamme and Jean Hindricks.
SeriesWorking papers / Queen Mary University of London Department of Economics -- 441
ContributionsHindriks, Jean.
ID Numbers
Open LibraryOL20251128M

jurisdictions to overcome political agency problems. Finally, as in the traditional yardstick competition model, information spillovers from other jurisdictions a⁄ect the delivery of public services in a jurisdiction. This forces local o¢ cials into a yardstick competition in . yardstick competition, e-government, agency problems. I. INTRODUCTION Performance evaluation of the public activity is one of the key issues in the public projects administration, and there are many studies concerned so far. Cost=Benefit analysis, for example, is well known method to evaluate.

Vote-Seeking, Tax-Setting, and Yardstick Competition. This paper dcvelops a model of the political economy of tax-setting in a multijurisdictional world, where coters' choices and incumbent behavior are determined simultaneously. Voters are assumed to make comparisons between jurisdictions to overcome political agency problems.   Yardstick competition between the EU as a whole and other parts of the world, however, is likely to start a dynamic process that could lead to the centralization of a large part of company lawmaking at the EU level and the emergence of a distinctive legal environment for firms doing business in Europe.

With regard to policy-making, yardstick competition represents a force, latent or actual, that constrains or influences the decisions of governments. The mechanism is simple but the political settings in which it operates, crucial for its understanding, are definitely complex. This paper investigates the behavior of rent-seeking politicians in an environment of increasing economic integration. The focus of the paper is on the implication of globalization-induced political yardstick competition for constitutional design with a view to the current discussion in the European Union.


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Yardstick competition and political agency problems by Paul Belleflamme Download PDF EPUB FB2

Yardstick competition and political agency problems Article (PDF Available) in Social Choice and Welfare 1(1) February with Reads How we measure 'reads'. This paper analyzes the role of yardstick competition for improving political decisions. We examine how performance comparisons across jurisdictions affect the agency problem resulting from uncertainty about politicians (adverse selection) and their.

Yardstick Competition and Political Agency Problems Article (PDF Available) in Social Choice and Welfare 24(1) February with 73 Reads How we measure 'reads'. Yardstick competition and political agency problems.

BELLEFLAMME, Paul & HINDRIKS, Jean, "Yardstick competition and political agency problems," CORE Discussion PapersUniversité catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). Paul Belleflamme & Jean Hendriks, Downloadable. This paper analyzes the role of yardstick competition for improving political decisions.

We examine how performance comparisons across jurisdictions affect the agency problem resulting from uncertainty about politicians (adverse selection) and their policies (moral hazard).

We study two forms of inefficiency: the provision of non-valuable programmes (over-provision) and the. We examine how yardstick competition between jurisdictions affects the agency problem resulting from uncertainty about politicians (adverse selection) and their policies (moral hazard).

We find that yardstick comparison can contribute both to disciplining and to selecting politicians. yardstick competition is powerless (Proposition 5) and that any such equilibrium must involve both good and bad incumbents acting the same way (Proposition 6).

This paper is related to the emerging literature on yardstick competition in political agency, speciÞcally the papers by Besley and Case () and Besley and Smart ().

Abstract. This paper analyzes the role of yardstick competition for improving political decisions. We examine how performance comparisons across jurisdictions affect the agency problem resulting from uncertainty about politicians (adverse selection) and their policies (moral hazard).

The model used to assess the effect of yardstick competition is set out in the next section. Our main result on the disciplining effect of yardstick comparison is presented in Sect.

Some concluding remarks are presented in Sect. 2 A multi-jurisdiction political agency model We use a two-period political agency model due to Coate and. This paper analyzes the role of yardstick competition for improving political decisions.

We examine how performance comparisons across jurisdictions affect the agency problem resulting from uncertainty about politicians (adverse selection) and their policies (moral hazard). We study two forms of inefficiency: the provision of non-valuable. Yardstick Competition among Governments Accountability and Policymaking when Citizens Look Across Borders Pierre Salmon.

Broad overview of yardstick competition; Links yardstick competition to insights of political economy and principal-agent theory; Combines theoretical, methodological, and empirical findings.

jurisdictions to overcome political agency problems. This forces incumbents into a (yardstick) competition in which they care about what other incumbents are doing. We provide a theoretical framework and empirical evidence using U.S. state data from. 1. Introduction. Political yardstick competition is seen as an instrument helping voters get a grip on elected administrators at relatively low cost (e.g., Besley and Smart, ).By comparing their incumbent’s performance with the performance of administrators in similar jurisdictions, voters can re-elect good politicians and send non-performers packing.

Measuring government effectiveness is essential to ensuring accountability, as is an informed public that is willing and able to hold elected officials and policy-makers accountable.

There are various forms of measurement, including against prior experience or compared to some ideal. In Yardstick Competition among Governments, Pierre Salmon argues that a more effective and insightful approach.

The focus is on the role of local governments under decentralization. Exploiting variation in the level of innovation in a large sample of US school districts, the impact of yardstick competition on the choice of public sector technologies is identified.

Yardstick competition may be biased by the presence of fiscal disparities between local governments. • By means of a laboratory experiment, we successfully test that equalization transfers may mitigate the yardstick bias.

• Local tax rates play an important role too. For higher tax rates level yardstick competition is more effective. Shleifer, Andrei. “A Theory of Yardstick Competition.” Rand Journal of Economics 16 (3):   Favorite books for different ages.

What's new in the third edition: A new, brief overview of issues in the development of bilingualism and biliteracy among Latino/Hispanic children; A new appendix on the "birthday cluster exercise" for applying the information in the book Reviews: A model of interstate toll competition is developed, and econometric issues are addressed.

No fiscal advantages to toll competition are identified, so the strategic behavior must be grounded in political yardstick competition. Voters are looking to what neighboring states are doing to see if their own politicians are doing a good job. Except for political yardstick competition, strategic horizontal interaction also may result from spillover effects, such as when expenditures on local pub-lic services have beneficial or detrimental effects on nearby jurisdictions (Case, Rosen, and Hines, ) or result from tax .tween local governors to overcome political agency problems.

As in the traditional yardstick competition model, information spillovers from other jurisdictions a⁄ect the delivery of public services in a jurisdiction. Thus, when the central government uses neighboring performance.efiects in districts that perform well or where political competition is low.

Among the potential explanations, only the presence of yardstick competition is consistent with these flndings. Apart from Besley and Case (), the paper is related to other theoretical contributions on political agency problems such as Coate and Morris ().